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In this paper, we focus on a particular element of the institutional diversity or fragmentation 
(Biermann et al. 2007) in global climate governance, namely the overlap between the UN 
climate regime and the World Trade Organization (WTO). We hold that this overlap not only 
implies benefits, but may also entail significant drawbacks for the development and 
implementation of the UN climate regime. This raises the question how this overlap can be 
addressed in a meaningful way in a post-2012 world. Our main argument is that, when 
developing future strategies for managing this overlap, policy-makers should draw lessons 
from the past, i.e. from potential negative effects of this overlap, and from the shortcomings 
of previous management approaches. We base our analysis mostly on qualitative research 
methods, including an assessment of the relevant international legal literature and an 
international relations analysis of related political processes; as well as an expert stakeholder 
workshop we co-organized with UNEP’s Economics and Trade Branch.  
In section 2, we introduce major issues on which the two regimes overlap and respective 
management approaches, which so far have hardly yielded significant results. In section 3, we 
discuss policy options which may be suitable to address these unresolved issues and debates 
in the future. We argue that appropriate strategies need to take into account core reasons for 
the observed interlinkages and for previous management failures: the constellation of 
strategic interests and the partial lack of consensual knowledge on climate-trade overlaps. We 
therefore suggest bringing in further expertise on climate-trade interlinkages (e.g. via a 
separate chapter in the next IPCC assessment report) as well as strategic issue linking (e.g. 






2.1 Overlaps between the UN climate regime and the world trade regime 
Over the last ten years, scholars from various disciplines have scrutinized the interplay 
between the UN climate regime and the world trade regime  (see, e.g., Brack et al. 2000; 
Chambers 2001a; Brewer 2003, 2004, Charnovitz 2003; Stokke 2004; Frankel 2005; van 
Asselt and Biermann 2007; Cosbey and Tarasofsky 2007; Howse and Eliason in press). These 
authors have identified a whole range of overlapping issues which fall into the jurisdictional 
scope of both regimes, while disagreeing about the synergetic or conflictive nature of each of 
these issues. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to present an exhaustive overview of 
these overlaps, let alone the various arguments made about their potential implications. This 
section therefore only presents a synopsis of the most important aspects. 
 
2.1.1 Flexibility mechanisms 
One overlap which has not yet been clarified concerns one of the climate regime’s core 
elements, namely emissions trading. Tradable allowances and credits have been established 
under the Kyoto Protocol, in particular under the three flexible mechanisms: the Clean 
Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, and international emissions trading. Article 
17 on international emissions trading ‘implicitly prevents Parties not included in Annex B 
from acquiring, issuing, or transferring emissions allowances under the Protocol’ (Werksman 
2001: 170). This restriction could be considered a form of trade discrimination since it 
effectively excludes the large majority of developing countries as well as non-parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol from emissions trading. 
However, this imbalance would only amount to a violation of WTO non-discrimination 
principles (i.e. most-favoured nation treatment or national treatment) if emission credits could 
be defined as either ‘goods or products’ under the GATT or ‘services’ under the GATS. Yet a 
classification of emission allowances as good or services is controversial and difficult to 
accomplish, as neither GATT nor GATS provide definitions for goods or services (Kim 2001: 
252). Some scholars have advised against such an interpretation (e.g. Werksman 2001: 155f., 
164). They argue that economic or financial value alone does not automatically constitute a 
definition as goods or services – similar to other entities such as electricity, oil or money 
which also do not fall under GATT or GATS requirements (Kim 2001: 252f.).1 Given this 
ambiguity – which can only be clarified by further treaty amendments or case law – one 
cannot definitely decide whether the case of trade restrictions in emission allowances 
constitutes a direct regime conflict (Brewer 2003: 337). 
Even when denying such a direct nature, there are further implications of emissions trading, 
which at least point to an indirect incompatibility. Given the abstract phrasing of Article 17, 
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various design options might be chosen for an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Depending 
on the ETS design, measures taken in the artificial market of emission allowances might also 
affect the trade in goods and services in existing markets. For instance, ‘brokerage, consulting 
and insurance services associated with emissions trading could be considered commercial 
services with the normal meaning of the term’ and thus potentially fall under GATS rules 
(Brewer 2003: 337; Martin 2007). In fact, given the variety of services which can be involved 
in an ETS, many scholars expect the GATS, rather than the GATT, to be applicable to 
international emissions trading (Petsonk 1999: 203f.; Cosbey and Tarasofsky 2007: 24). 
Another important design option which might collide with WTO law is the allocation of 
emission allowances. Certain allocation methods could be interpreted as the favourable 
treatment of a domestic industry over foreign competitors, in particular if a domestic ETS 
stipulates the free-of-charge distribution of allowances. In fact, such a free allocation of 
financial assets might be classified as a subsidy (Howse and Eliason in press). However, the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) prohibits subsidies 
which are specific to an enterprise or industry or subsidies which ‘can bring adverse effects to 
the interests of other Members’ (Article 1). The free allocation of emission allowances might 
hence be challenged under the SCM Agreement. In addition, allocation procedures may 
collide with the national treatment principle under GATT Article III. Foreign fuel producers 
or suppliers might claim that the free allocation of allowances to domestic producers 
discriminates against them: their ‘like products’ are treated differently than the subsidized 
products of domestic fuel producers or suppliers (Cosbey and Tarasofsky 2007: 23; Voigt 
2008: 59f.). 
2.1.2 Trade-related policies and measures 
The Kyoto Protocol (Articles 2[1a] and 2[2]) lists various policies and measures (PAMs), by 
which Annex I countries shall achieve emission limitations. These PAMs include, for 
instance, research, development and use of renewable energy and climate-friendly 
technologies; reduction or phasing out of fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions, and 
subsidies in all GHG emitting sectors; and limiting and reducing GHG emissions in the 
transport sector. This notwithstanding, the protocol’s list lacks specificity. For instance, it 
does not spell out concrete steps or targets to achieve the listed items. Moreover, the list is 
not mandatory. Due to this low level of obligation and precision, it is not ruled out that 
parties apply certain trade-distorting and not fully WTO-compliant measures.2  
More precisely, there is a whole range of overlaps and possible clashes, due to the potential 
implementation of certain fiscal measures (subsidies, tariffs, or border taxes), regulatory 
measures (standards, technical regulations and labelling) and government procurement 
practices. Annex I parties might consider such measures in order to flank their GHG emission 
reduction activities or to protect domestic industries that are adversely affected by the 
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 This can be termed an ‘indirect conflict’ with WTO rules: there is no immediate rule collision with the WTO, 
but the Kyoto Protocol’s permissive rules on PAMs might nonetheless induce respective behaviour (cf. Vranes 
2006; Zelli 2008). 
4 
 
implementation of climate policies – in other words: to level the playing field between 
regulated domestic industries and unregulated foreign competitors (Frankel 2005: 15). 
Subsidies to firms for climate-friendly products, research, development or export might not 
be allowed under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Santarius 
et al. 2004: 25). The key questions are how specific a subsidy is (does it only concern 
selected industries?) and what injury it might cause to others (van Asselt and Biermann 2007: 
501).  
Governments might also choose to put burdens on energy-inefficient foreign companies, by 
imposing tariffs or taxes on their greenhouse gas-intensive imports. One major uncertainty 
about the WTO-compatibility of such measures relates to the question of product related 
processes and production methods (PPMs). Energy input tariffs do not apply to the end-use of 
a product, but to its ‘embedded carbon’, i.e. GHGs emitted during the product’s life cycle. 
Yet if a WTO panel – in a possible future dispute – only considered end-uses, such process-
related taxes would be found to violate the national treatment principle under GATT Article 
III (2) which demands similar taxing for ‘like products’ (cf. Biermann and Brohm 2005: 291). 
In the same vein, marginal taxes on energy-intensive goods from countries which are not 
party to the Kyoto Protocol or do not take ‘comparable’ climate change action might violate 
both the national treatment and most-favoured nation principles of the GATT. Such border 
adjustment measures (BAMs) might become a reality in the not too distant future. A number 
of industrialized countries have been considering offsetting measures at the border 
complementing an ETS – most recently the US Congress, the French government, as well as 
the European Commission (Cosbey 2008). Experts have been leading longstanding debates 
on BAMs, either holding that, under certain circumstances, they could be defended and 
sustained under WTO law (e.g. Biermann and Brohm 2005; Ismer and Neuhoff 2007; 
Pauwelyn 2007) or rather warning against their protectionist implications and possible 
violation of the GATT (e.g. Bhagwati and Mavroidis 2007; Quick 2008).  
Furthermore, any product standards, labels or technical regulations, which establish minimum 
requirements for goods on the basis of their energy or GHG-intensity during production or 
use might conflict with the national treatment principle under the GATT or with the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (Santarius et al. 2004: 25). The climate 
regime’s PAM regulations also permit certain government procurement policies – i.e. 
government purchases of goods and services – which might create tensions with the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement. Yet altogether, while subsidies, tariffs and border 
adjustment measures might be more prone to a legal challenge, government procurement, 
labelling and standards (at least voluntary ones) are rather unlikely to collide with WTO rules 
(van Asselt and Biermann 2007: 502; van Asselt et al. 2006: 224) 
In summary, there is a whole array of ‘unresolved issues’ (Brewer 2003: 228). These indirect 
overlaps have been acknowledged from both sides. The WTO Secretariat has referred to 
potential tensions arising from PAMs in various notes on the relationship with the UN 
climate regime (Brewer 2003: 334f.). Furthermore, both the UNFCCC (Article 3[5]) and the 
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Kyoto Protocol (Article 2[3]) include provisions which signal negotiators’ concerns (Linnér 
2006: 285), asking parties to ‘minimize adverse effects’ when implementing PAMs. So far, 
however, climate negotiations have paid very little attention to the relationship of the climate 
regime to WTO norms. For instance, it was not until 2003 that the UNFCCC Secretariat 
summarised the state of the negotiations in the WTO relevant for the climate regime 
(UNFCCC 2003). 
 
2.1.3 Transfer of climate-friendly goods, services and technologies 
While the two previous examples rather point to potential conflicts between the UN climate 
regime and the WTO, there are also win-win constellations, in particular the removal of trade 
barriers in favour of climate-friendly goods or services, and the development and transfer of 
low-emission technologies. Article 4(5) UNFCCC states that ‘developed country Parties … 
shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer 
of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particu-
larly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Conven-
tion’. This provision is based on a broad understanding of technology transfer, which 
includes capacity building – in terms of human resources and knowledge bases – in the 
receiving countries. However, instead of facilitating knowledge transfer and capacity 
building, companies in developed countries have much higher incentives to build new 
technologies completely ‘in house’ in order to secure maximum profits and reduce investors’ 
risks. Only once the technology is ‘ready’, they might fully insist on the rules of trade 
liberalization, asking the receiving countries to reduce the respective import barriers.  
What role does WTO law play in this constellation? On the one hand, the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) strengthens the position of 
technology developers, since it opposes national sovereignty – and subsequent protectionism 
– over intellectual property rights. Moreover, the most-favoured nation provisions for goods 
(under GATT) and services (under GATS) guarantee that certain measures which facilitate 
technology transfer towards selected countries (e.g. as granted by the United States in several 
bilateral and multilateral treaties) are expanded to all WTO members (Brewer 2008b). On the 
other hand, the TRIPS Agreement might render the acquisition of technologies more costly, 
to the disadvantage of developing countries (Littleton 2008: 7ff.). Moreover, the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) can constrain the ability of 
acquiring countries’ governments to act by excluding the use of certain interventions, for 
example by not allowing enforcement of performance requirements on multinational 
corporations (Subbarao 2008: 14). 
Similarly to the two earlier discussed topics, there is hence a great deal of uncertainty about 
the exact implications of WTO rules for climate-related policies and vice versa. 
 
2.2 Management approaches and their shortcomings 
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While acknowledging these various overlaps, policy-makers in both regimes have so far 
fallen short of appropriate management approaches, i.e. approaches to enhance synergies or 
tackle the potentially negative implications. These approaches have so far largely taken place 
under the umbrella of the WTO – and either have ended up in narrow mandates or in stalled 
debates. 
The EU and Switzerland submitted proposals in the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE) as early as 1996. They called for an ‘environmental window’ in favour 
of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Such a window might take the form of a 
savings clause, such as an extension of the environmental exceptions under Article XX 
GATT, or even the adoption of a whole new WTO agreement on the relationship with MEAs. 
Both of these tools intended to grant certain MEA rules a permanent waiver with regard to 
the WTO principles on non-discrimination (Sampson 2001: 74; Santarius et al. 2004: 15-16; 
Zelli 2007). For the UN climate regime, this could have implied waivers for any restrictions 
on the trade in emission allowances or for the implementation of certain trade-restrictive 
PAMs. However, such proposals met considerable resistance by other parties, especially 
developing countries who feared that such ‘carte blanche’ was a disguise for green 
protectionism (Neumann 2002: 330).   
After these failed attempts, the EU and Switzerland tried to reinvigorate CTE discussions at 
the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001. In fact, an explicit mandate for clarification of the 
WTO-MEA relationship was one of the EU’s ‘‘must haves’ for launching a new WTO round’ 
(Haverkamp 2001: 5). This mandate was included in para. 31(i) of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA), to be debated in the Special Session of the CTE (CTE-SS). However, the 
mandate was restricted in three ways. First, due to resistance by the US, Australia and the 
bulk of developing countries, the formula of para. 31(i) was narrowed to the applicability of 
existing WTO rules with regard to existing MEA rules – i.e. leaving out any COP decisions. 
This interpretation significantly limits prospects for any legal concessions to a post-2012 
climate agreement, since the COPs are supposed to flesh out the rather abstract regulations of 
such an agreement on tradable allowances, PAMs and other issues. Second, the same 
countries also achieved that another controversial question was ‘carved out from the 
mandate’s scope’ (Palmer and Tarasofsky 2007: 14), namely the application of MEA trade 
measures to non-parties. Third, CTE-SS debates soon got stuck in formal and technical 
controversies about the possible scope and procedure of the negotiations. In the end, only 
specific and mandatory provisions have been discussed. This implies an exclusion of trade-
related PAMs, since the list of PAMs under Article 2(1a) of the Kyoto Protocol is only 
indicative and not specific.  
A look at other Doha Round discussions – on environmental goods and services (EGS) 
(under DDA para. 31[iii]), market access (32[i]) and eco-labelling (32[iii]) – further confirms 
that developing countries have oftentimes been the most determined opponents of any 
concessions for MEAs in general and the UN climate regime in particular. These debates 
concern the third overlapping issue identified above, i.e. climate-friendly goods, services and 
technologies, but also are relevant for the issue of PAMs. ‘[W]hereas many industrial 
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countries regarded [measures such as eco-taxes or eco-labelling] as important environmental 
instruments, developing countries feared restrictions on their market access’ (Santarius et al. 
2004: 14). For instance, in 2002 Saudi Arabia tabled a proposal in the CTE and the Doha 
Round’s Non-Agricultural Market Access Negotiating Group. In line with OPEC strategies in 
the UN climate regime on adverse impacts of PAMs (Articles 3[14] of the Kyoto Protocol 
and 4[18] of the Convention), this proposal called for the removal of energy-related subsidies 
in OECD countries. Most remarkably, the proposal did not only target subsidies for the coal 
or nuclear sectors, but also for climate-friendly sectors like renewable energies (Yamin and 
Depledge 2004: 256).3 But also non-OPEC members have carried the debate on adverse 
impacts into the WTO. A major proposal by India has largely criticized the negative effects 
of environmental measures on the market access for products from LDCs and other 
developing countries (Harashima 2008: 27).4 So far, these developing country proposals have 
met rejection from both the EU and the US. 
Not too surprisingly, developing countries were far more sceptical about trade liberalization 
once discussions addressed access to their own markets. In the EGS debate under DDA para. 
31(iii), they have strongly criticized a ‘list approach’ suggested by OECD countries. In their 
approach, the EU and the US listed a large number of environmental goods and services, 
including climate-friendly ones, for which trade barriers should be removed or reduced. 
Developing countries, in turn, held that the ‘list approach’ was just a disguise for a different 
purpose: since many of the listed goods had multiple uses, the approach rather secured wide-
ranging access to developing country markets (Jha 2008: 2ff.). Therefore, India proposed a 
much narrower ‘project approach’, which only allows temporary trade liberalization for 
goods and services associated with an approved environmental project (ICTSD 2007: 12ff.). 
Moreover, India and OPEC members demanded a relaxation of intellectual property 
standards under the TRIPS agreement in order to support transfer of specific climate-friendly 
technologies (ICTSD 2008a: 6). Due to this standoff between North and South, EGS 
discussions have shared the fate of other CTE debates, making no major progress so far (cf. 
World Bank 2008: 75ff.).5 
The various WTO-internal debates on overlaps with environmental regimes have thus largely 
ended up in negotiation stalemates. These stalemates are tied to the overall slow progress of 
the Doha Round. Since the DDA constitutes a ‘single undertaking’, progress on the ‘trade and 
environment’ mandate under paras. 31 and 32 depends on the success of talks on other Doha 
items, especially on tariff and subsidy cuts in the industrial goods and agriculture 
negotiations. An agreement on these issues ‘would give delegates a sense of what products to 
include in the liberalisation agreement and would provide a more solid idea of the potential 
extent of any tariff cuts’ (ICTSD 2008b). To take another illustration: debates on para. 31(ii) 
on permanent observer status of the UNFCCC and other MEAs have been hijacked by an 
                                                     
3
 Doc. No. TN/TE/W/9. [http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/com/doha/tn/tn_te_w_009.pdf] (last accessed 10 
November 2008).  
4
 Doc. No. WT/CTE/W/207. [http://commerce.nic.in/wt_cte_W207.pdf] (last accessed 10 November 2008). 
5
 In addition to the dual use problem, CTE-SS parties also disagree on the definition of environmental goods 
(based on environmental end-use or also on the environmental production process?) (World Bank 2008: 75ff.). 
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overarching conflict among WTO members. To date, members of the Arab League and 
countries sympathetic to the league have blocked any applications for WTO observer status 
by international organizations or regimes. They thereby retaliate against the ongoing denial of 
observer status to the Arab League.  
Many of the aforementioned overlaps and the shortcomings of management approaches have 
exerted a rather detrimental effect on the jurisdictional scope and rule development of the UN 
climate regime. This is due in part to the higher degree of delegation in the WTO, where 
many important interpretations of WTO rules regarding the overlap of trade and the 
environment have been issued by its dispute settlement bodies. Scholars have argued that the 
shadow of WTO law and its stronger dispute settlement system may provoke anticipative or 
‘chill effects’ (Stilwell and Tuerk 1999; Eckersley 2004). In order not to risk any legal 
challenge before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, parties to the UN climate regime 
might refrain from the elaboration or implementation of more ambitious trade-relevant 
climate protection measures (Oberthür 2006: 57). Moreover, they might even refrain from 
developing more concrete provisions for the UN climate regime itself (Gehring and Oberthür 
2006: 314-16).  
Indeed, since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, negotiators have avoided any trade-
restrictive modalities. For instance, the list of ‘policies and measures’ has remained purely 
indicative and non-exhaustive. A mandatory coordinated set of PAMs – e.g. with trade 
restrictions similar to those in the Montreal Protocol or the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species – has not evolved, showing the limited degree of stringency in the 
climate regime. Furthermore, while a relatively strong compliance mechanism was 
established, trade restrictions were largely omitted. Non-compliance may lead to exclusion 
from emissions trading and reduction of the cap in the next commitment period. Yet although 
proposed by the EU, non-compliance does not entail financial penalties or a loss of carbon 
credits, nor does it include any other trade sanctions (Stokke 2004: 352). Finally, there has 
been no significant elaboration of the dispute settlement procedure of the UN climate regime, 
leaving the possibility that countries bring a case before the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism (Chambers 2001b: 103). In other words, the UN climate regime has no ultimate 
clout over cases that immediately affect its jurisdiction.  
By the same token, negotiators have so far not reached any legal concessions of WTO rules 
in favour of the UN climate regime. The various deadlocks and restrictions we discussed 
above rather point to a legal prevalence of the WTO on the overlapping issues. For instance, 
leaving party-non-party disputes de facto under the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism makes it more likely that the non-parties to UN climate regime will 
challenge trade-related climate measures in the future. 
In summary, it is evident that the legal status quo implies a lack of clarity which has negative 
effects for the development and implementation of the UN climate regime rather than for the 
WTO. This raises the question how these overlaps can be addressed in a meaningful way, 
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avoiding the deadlocks in which management approaches have ended up. We address this 
question in our final section.   
 
3 Policy recommendations for addressing the climate-trade overlap in a post-2012 world 
 
The previous considerations have shown, first of all, that there are still many unresolved 
issues and debates in the climate-trade overlap that need addressing. Management approaches 
in both the climate regime and the WTO have so far not resulted in cooperative and 
pragmatic solutions to the relationship between the two regimes. What is more, the world 
trade regime may result in a potential chill effect, which might harm post-2012 climate 
policies in the long run.  
 
It is important to understand the reasons for the current overlaps and the shortcomings of 
previous management approaches. A first potential reason concerns the strategic constellation 
of parties. Both in the climate and trade negotiations, powerful coalitions of countries 
influence the outcome of climate-trade interactions. In the UN climate regime, these blocks 
include the EU, the Umbrella Group (a loose coalition of the US, Canada and other non-
European developed countries like Australia, Canada, Russia and Japan), and the G-77 & 
China which in turn embraces a diverse range of sub-groups such as OPEC members, least-
developed countries, and small-island developing states. In the WTO, groups are not identical 
and much more differentiated (especially developing country groups), but roughly follow this 
threefold pattern with disparate levels of in-group cohesion. The various interests of these 
coalitions can in part help explain the observed state of overlap between both regimes. This 
holds in particular for the ‘WTO-compliant’ development of the UN climate regime (i.e. its 
largely market-based mechanisms), and the poor outcome of CTE negotiations on WTO-
MEA overlaps under para. 31(i). Another potential reason is likely to be the high 
uncertainties and the lack of consensual knowledge about climate-trade overlaps. Although a 
great body of research exists on the overlaps between the climate regime and the WTO, the 
IPCC reports so far do not even include a comprehensive analysis. Instead, with the exception 
of a 2000 special report on technology transfer, passages on the overlaps with the WTO are 
rather dispersed throughout the IPCC’s assessment reports. This reflects the controversy and 
uncertainty about many of the climate-trade overlaps, e.g. the aforementioned debates about 
the WTO-compliance of PAMs like subsidies or border tax adjustments, or the lack of clarity 
about the benefits of TRIPS relaxations for North-South technology transfer. 
We conclude this paper with some preliminary policy recommendations for addressing this 
particular aspect of the institutional fragmentation of global climate governance. 
With regard to the lack of consensual knowledge, it appears important to bring in further 
expertise to inform discussions on climate-trade issues and to move discussions away from 
mostly considering unilateral trade measures such as border adjustment measures. It is crucial 
to first gather more evidence on the implications of such measures, including their 
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environmental and economic effects, chances to discipline such measures in multilateral 
agreements, and indirect impact on climate negotiations (for example in light of perceptions 
by developing countries). Such evidence could be provided by a separate chapter in the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), either on 
climate-trade overlaps in general, or on unilateral and multilateral trade-related approaches in 
particular. Moreover, the WTO CTE could open up to regular scientific advice on 
environmental matters, for instance, by establishing a standing advisory body. 
Given the ongoing change in expertise on these overlaps, one pragmatic option for several 
overlap issues is to build the uncertainty into respective strategies. For instance, one option to 
handle BAMs could be a flexible system based on multilateral discussions. Such a system 
could address critical issues in the design of BAMs, such as sectoral and country coverage 
(taking into account country’s common but differentiated responsibilities), and setting 
appropriate levels for the border adjustments(Climate Strategies 2008). A flexible expertise-
based approach might also be an option suitable for another major issue of climate-trade 
overlap, the removal of trade barriers for climate-friendly goods and services. Instead of a 
fixed list of climate-friendly goods and services, the US and EU could propose a ‘living list’, 
which can be amended based on further scientific input. For instance, building on carbon life-
cycle analyses of goods and services, sustainability criteria for the removal of trade barriers 
could be developed.  
As regards coordination among different country coalitions, informal forums or dialogues 
might be a more suitable starting point to discuss management attempts first, as they are less 
prone to political sensitivities such as fear of protectionism. Several of these dialogues have 
already been initiated, e.g. the Gleneagles Dialogue, the Major Economies Process on Energy 
Security and Climate Change, and the Informal Trade Ministers Dialogue on Climate Change 
Issues during COP-13 in Bali. However, it is important to arrange the dialogue across 
ministries, i.e. between governmental representatives for environment, trade and 
development. Such a dialogue could provide a platform to discuss overlap questions outside 
of the WTO.  
Finally, policy recommendations should accommodate the strategic interests of the involved 
country coalitions and the constellation of these interests. To this end, delegates in both 
institutions should further explore opportunities for issue-linking – more than has been the 
case so far. Issue-linking implies that countries or country coalitions consider aspects from 
related debates in their strategies. This can result in proposals for coordination, side-payments 
or even induce package deals. What sounds utopian at first glance has been regular practice in 
international politics in general and international trade in particular (ultimately in the form of 
the WTO which links a wide range of issues) – and has even found its way into 
recommendations of IPCC reports (cf. IPCC 2001: 624-27). The most noteworthy example of 
a constructed link among climate and trade interests is the Russian ratification of the Kyoto 




The underlying intuition of ‘tactical issue linkage’ (Haas 1980; Folmer et al. 1993; Cesar and 
De Zeeuw 1996) – or even package deals – is that they can solve asymmetries among 
countries, each country gaining on a different issue, thereby making the agreement profitable 
to all participants (IPCC 2001: 626f.). In terms of game theory, such tactical issue-linkage 
can connect two separate bargaining situations, creating a new pay-off matrix with altered 
preferences, i.e. an overall constellation which is more conducive to cooperation. Combining 
climate and trade issues in an overall deal might hence produce new bargaining chips and 
provide new leverage to deadlocked negotiations (Zürn 1990: 166-73). 
This notwithstanding, package deals are far from being a panacea. While the potential 
number of tactical issue-linkages between climate and trade issues is infinite, most of these 
linkages are neither feasible nor sensible. Caveats one needs to consider include the nature of 
the linked issues. As climate negotiations provide a public good, that is, a good with non-
excludable benefits, incentives are high to free ride. To reduce this, issue linking is sensible 
especially in negotiations on issues with excludable benefits, for example deals on 
technology transfer. Moreover, the agendas of both post-2012 climate governance and the 
Doha negotiations are overburdened, which slows down progress (ICTSD 2008c). Additional 
topics could hence easily make matters worse. The choice of topics therefore needs to 
guarantee balanced benefits for all parties. Moreover, in the Doha Round, trade topics tend to 
be more important to parties than climate concerns. This imbalance of preferences thus needs 
to be taken into account.  
We briefly explore two examples for which it might be feasible to further integrate country 
strategies in the Doha Round and post-2012 negotiations. First, the EU could consider linking 
its position on the relationship between the WTO and multilateral environmental agreements 
under DDA para. 31(i) to its position on the TRIPS agreement. In the former debate, the EU 
has asked for legal concessions under WTO law in favour of trade-related measures under 
multilateral environmental agreements, however meeting opposition from developing 
countries who fear green protectionism. But in the second debate, some developing countries 
have demanded concessions in favour of specific environmental concerns: Brazil, India and 
other countries have called for an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to reflect 
requirements of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Moreover, some developing 
countries have asked for TRIPS exemptions to facilitate the transfer of climate-friendly 
technologies under DDA para. 31(iii). With all these debates concerning some form of legal 
concessions under WTO law, there is potential for strategic issue linking: for instance, 
movement from one side on the debate between WTO and multilateral environmental 
agreements could trigger progress in TRIPS-related discussions. 
A second option for issue linking are overlapping discussions on environmental goods and 
services, and biofuels. In the Doha Round, under DDA para. 31(iii), the US and the EU have 
requested developing countries to liberalize trade policies to allow more transfers of 
environmental goods and services. Brazil and other developing countries have criticized the 
fact that the list of environmental goods and services presented by the EU and the US does 
not feature biofuels. Moreover, Brazil has included US subsidies of biofuels in a dispute it 
12 
 
filed in the WTO in 2007 (Brewer 2008a: 24). In light of this overlap, concessions from one 
or both sides on biofuels might help reinvigorate the debate on environmental goods and 
services. Such a concession could for instance come close to the aforementioned idea of a 
‘living list’ which could include biofuels that fulfil certain sustainability criteria. These 
criteria could be developed and discussed under the UN climate regime, based on potential 
future IPCC work, as suggested above. This consideration of sustainable biofuels would 
accommodate the interests of some developing countries and raise the chances of a more 
comprehensive deal on trade barrier removals for environmental goods and services. 
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